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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW"
curity for the loan, and will not be compelled to transfer the property
to the borrower until he repays the loan.'
Constructive Trust
In July, 1947, plaintiff purchased real estate in Ohio, title to which
he placed in defendant's name because she said to him "I'm your wife.
You don't have anything in my name. I think you should put this in my
name." Subsequently, plaintiff learned that at the -time of his marriage
to defendant she had a husband who was - and still is - living, and
from whom she had not been divorced. Plaintiff thereupon brought suit
in the court of common pleas, asking that a constructive trust be im-
pressed upon the property for his benefit and that the property be trans-
ferred to him by a proper instrument of conveyance. From a judgment
for the plaintiff, defendant appealed on questions of law and fact. In
affirming the judgment, the court of appeals found that the plaintiff
bought the property as an investment and placed the title in the de-
fendant's name because of her misrepresentation as to her marital status
and not as a gift to her, and not to place it beyond reach of his creditors.2
Insurance Trust
An agreement between a beneficiary under a life insurance policy and
a second party where, "in consideration of said second party paying the
premiums when due," the beneficiary "agrees that he will endorse and
pay over unto the second party any proceeds or benefits that he may re-
ceive or have the right to receive under said policy," is valid; and a trust
in favor of the second party will be imposed upon the proceeds of the
policy when the insured dies.3
ROBERT C. BENSING
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Proof of Will at Probate
The Ohio Revised Code' sets forth the following formality for the
execution of wills in Ohio:
Except oral wills, every last will and testament shall be in writing . . .
signed at the end by the party making it,... and be attested and subscribed
1. Pietro v. Pietro, 151 N.E.2d 916 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
2. Malone v. White, 153 N.E.2d 413 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
3. Finney v. Hinkle, 153 N.E.2d 699 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
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in the presence of such party, by two or more competent witnesses, who
saw the testator subscribe, or heard him acknowledge his signature.
In Blankner v. Lathrop,2 the executor was one of the two necessary sub-
scribing witnesses. In Fazekus v. Gobozy,3 a person who was the executor
and also a trustee under the will was an essential subscribing witness.
In each of the cases the courts upheld the validity of the wills.
In neither of the foregoing cases was any witness to the respective
wills a devisee or legatee. Both were executors and one was also a testa-
mentary trustee who received fixed fees for services rendered.4 Conse-
quently the section of the Ohio Revised Code5 which makes devisees and
legatees competent witnesses by voiding the testamentary gift had no
application.
An undesirable aspect of statutory technical requirements to the exe-
cution of documents is dearly evident in the case of In re La Mar's Will.6
In this case the probate court refused to probate a will because, according
to the oral testimony of the two subscribing witmsses, they did not see
testatrix sign the will, testatrix did not acknowledge her signature to
them, and the will was so folded that they could not see testatrix' signa-
ture at the time they subscribed.
The Ohio Revised Code7 as set forth above, as to wills executed in
Ohio, specifically requires the testator to sign in the presence of the
subscribing witnesses or to acknowledge his signature to them. Conse-
quently, by applying the specific language of the statute to the facts as
related and in construing this language in light of the decisions of other
states, the probate court's determination was proper.
8
It is significant that in the LaMar case the subscribing witnesses un.
hesitatingly and unequivocally testified at the hearing to probate the
will that testatrix' signature at the end of her will was genuine. In
Pennsylvania which simply requires that a will be proved by two com-
petent witnesses who do not have to be subscribing witnesses, there would
have been no problem in probating this willY
1. OHIo REv. CODE § 2107.03.
2. 154 N.E.2d 95 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
3. 78 Ohio L Abs. 258, 150 N.E.2d 319 (Ct. App. 1958).
4. 1 PAGE, WILLs §§ 325, 327 (3d ed. 1941).
5. § 2107.15.
6. 146 N.E.2d 472 (Ohio P. Ct. 1957).
7. § 2107.03.
8. Note, 4 WEsT. s. L. Rnv. 158 (1953); 1 PAGE, WILLS § 349 (3d ed. 1941)
9. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.2, 180.4 (1950).
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If both subscribing witnesses to the LaMar will had predeceased the
testatrix, their signatures would 'have been proved by witnesses who were
familiar with their signatures and the testatrix' will would have been
probated.
In Ohio, a will is entitled to -probate upon the making of a prima
facie case.10 The LaMar will contained the usual attestation clause which
either stated that testatrix signed in the presence of the subscribing
witnesses or that testatrix acknowledged her signature in the presence
of these witnesses. Many courts hold that a recital of due execution
creates a presumption that the facts were as recited. Thus there
is in the LaMar case a conflict between the attestation clause and the later
oral testimony of the subscribing witnesses. The probate court was cer-
tainly not required to ignore this conflict. There is some danger in giving
too much weight to oral testimony of a subscribing witness at probate
when his testimony is inconsistent with the formal attestation clause.
Memory is not infallible and is certainly not necessarily reliable because of
its apparent clarity. 1
For the foregoing reasons, the writer restates his position that the
Pennsylvania statute is an improvement over statutes similar to Ohio's.' 2
Will Contest13
In Greer v. Stiver,14 an action to contest the will was filed one day
prior to the expiration of the statutory six-month period for contest.
Summons were issued the same day against all necessary parties except
one heir. This heir was named as a defendant and was united in interest
with all the other co-defendants. Therefore, the court, following the
earlier case of Draher v. Walters, 5 overruled defendant's motion to dis-
miss for want of jurisdiction.
10. In re Estate of Lyons, 166 Ohio St. 207, 141 N.E.2d 151 (1957).
11. ". . . even where a subscribing witness denies the existence of certain facts
necessary for the legal execution of the will, the presumption of regularity may pre-
vail over such direct evidence. The subscribing witness by acting as such, in effect
formally declares that all the facts necessary to the legal execution of the will exist,
and in advance, by acting as a subscribing witness, he has seriously discredited his
subsequent denial of these facts under oath." 2 PAGE, WILLS 5 758 (3d ed. 1941).
12. 8 WEST. RES. L REv. 383, 384 (1957).
13. Two 1958 cases, Fletcher v. First National Bank, 167 Ohio St. 211, 147 N.E.2d
621 (1958) and Abort v. Dawson 167 Ohio St. 238, 147 N.E.2d 609 (1958), are
considered in the 1957 Survey of Ohio Law.
14. 149 N.E.2d 56 (Ohio C.P. 1958).
15. 130 Ohio St. 92, 196 N.E. 884 (1935).
Uune
SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1958
Rights of Surviving Spouse - Purchase of
Mansion House
The Ohio Revised Code' 6 dearly defines mansion house as "including
the parcel of land on which such house is situated and lots or farm land
adjacent thereto and used in conjunction therewith as the home of the
decedent." Therefore, in Young V. Young,17 the court of appeals prop-
erly reversed the probate court for refusing to allow a widow -to buy her
deceased husband's undivided half interest in a small tract (36.87 acres)
of farmland upon which their home was located.
Administration - Presentation of Claims and Revival
The Revised Code 18 provides that when an action is brought against a
defendant who thereafter dies before the Plaintiff's claim has been heard,
written notice of application to revive the action against the deceased's
personal representative must be given to the personal representative with-
in the statutory time for presentation of claims of creditors. The Ohio
Supreme Court properly reversed the common pleas court and the court
of appeals in Miller v. Andre'9 because -the action was revived against
defendant's personal representative within the statutory period.
The Miller case arose from a motor vehicle accident. The defendant
died March 2, 1954 and his widow was appointed executrix on May 14,
1954. However, plaintiff did not learn of defendant's death until No-
vember 29, 1954 at a pre-trial hearing. On December 2, 1954 plaintiff
moved to substitute defendant's executrix as defendant and the court
granted the motion.
Since the motion for substitution was made more than four months
after the appointment of defendant's executrix, plaintiff, on January 13,
1955, petitioned the probate court for authority to present her claim
after the four months limitation and within the nine months limitation.
In the meantime on January 21, 1955 defendant's executrix died and an
administrator d.b.n., c.t.a. of defendant's estate was appointed. Conse-
quently on March 4, 1955, the probate court authorized presentment of
plaintiff's claim to this administrator. Plaintiff claimed that the admin-
istrator was served with an affidavit of claim March 7, 1955, but the
administrator denied any service or presentment of a claim to him. On
March 7, 1955, plaintiff petitioned the common pleas court to substitute
the administrator d.b.n., c.t.a. as defendant and service was had on the
16. § 2113.38 (A).
17. 106 Ohio App. 206, 154 N.E.2d 19 (1958).
18. 5 2311.31.
19. 167 Ohio St. 83, 146 N.E.2d 598 (1957).
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administrator March 11, 1955. After a hearing September 30, 1955 on
plaintiff's motion for an order of revivor, the motion was overruled and
the case dismissed because plaintiff had failed to present her claim to
the administrator d.b.n., c.t.a. and to have it rejected before moving to
revive the action.
The Ohio Supreme Court overruled the common pleas court and the court
of appeals because the probate court granted plaintiffs petition for an
extension of time and plaintiff had complied with the Ohio Revised
Code.20 Plaintiff complied with the Code by serving upon defend-
ant's executrix within nine months of her appointment a copy of the
petition to revive the action against the executrix. It was therefore un-
necessary to present any claim after the death of the executrix to the
administrator d.b.n, c.t.a.
As a general rule statutes of limitation do not run against the state
unless they specifically so provide. For this reason the court of appeals
in Division of Aid for Aged v. Mull2 1 held that the state's claim against
the estate of a person who received public aid was not barred by its
failure to sue within two months after receipt of notice of the rejection of
its claim.
In the case of In re Estate of Sowards, 22 the court of appeals also pro-
tected the claim of -the state for the care of a mentally incompetent per-
son who died in a state institution against the contention that it was
barred by the Ohio nonclaim statute.23 In the Sowards case the court
construed the Ohio Revised Code 24 as placing the burden upon the per-
sonal representative of a person who dies while an "inmate of any benevo-
lent institution under the jurisdiction of the department of mental hygiene
... and who is possessed of property," to ascertain from the department
whether the decedent was supported while an inmate. Accordingly there
was no duty on the state to file its claim.
This writer believes that the Ohio non-claim statute should be
amended to specifically include claims by the state against the estate of
a decedent. Such an amendment would facilitate the orderly and prompt
administration of estates.25
The last of the cases involving the non-claim statute is In re Estate of
Wyckoff.26 In the Wyckoff case claimant's administrator was his father
20. §§ 2311.31, 2117.07.
21. 105 Ohio App. 305, 152 N.E.2d 295 (1957).
22. 105 Ohio App. 239, 152 N.E.2d 146 (1957).
23. § 2117.06.
24. § 5121.07.
25. SIMES, MODEL PROBATE CODE § 135 (1946).
26. 105 Ohio App. 212, 152 N.E.2d 141 (1958).
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who was judicially incompetent for 40 days of the four-month period
during which the claim for wrongful death should have been submitted.
For this reason, under the exception to the non-claim statute where a
claimant was subject "to any legal disability during such period or any
part thereof," the probate court, within its discretion, properly allowed
the filing of the claim after the expiration of the four-month period.
Priority
A more difficult case involving the Division of Aid for -the Aged is
Fultz v. Singer.2 7 In the Singer case the Division contended that its
lien for $7,507 under the Ohio Revised Code2 s was prior to the widow's
exemption of $540 and her allowance of $1800 for a year's support.
The probate court was unable to accept this construction. It con-
strued various sections of the Revised Code29 together and ordered dis-
tribution of the proceeds from the sale of decedents realty, in the follow-
ing order: costs and expense of sale of realty including administrator's
fee and attorney's fee,30 taxes, penalties and interest against realty;8 '
other costs of administration, including attorney's fee;32 funeral expenses
not in excess of $300; 3 widow's exemption,e 4 widow's support allow-
ance8 5 reimbursement of Division of Aid for Aged upon its lien and
preferred daims.38
Private Sale of Securities With Court Approval
The case of Dombey v. Rindfoos37 involves an attempt by the execu-
tors, pursuant to their powers in .the will and with the approval of the pro-
bate court to sell at private sale the testator's bank stock and testator's
savings and loan company stock, both of which had a substantial but no
established market value. Testator's will conferred upon his executors the
same powers of sale as it granted to the testamentary trustees. In addition
to a provision that the stock should not be sold for less than its book value
it read in part as follows:
27. 78 Ohio L. Abs. 177, 149 N.E.2d 270 (Ohio P. Ct. 1958).
28. § 5105.24.





34. § 2115.13, 2117.25, 5105.13.
35. §§ 2117.20, 2117.25, 5105.13.
36. § 5105.13.
37. 105 Ohio App. 335, 151 N.E.2d 563 (1958).
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(h) Subject only to the restrictions mentioned in this Item V... any
said Trustees shall have and exercise all of the powers, privileges and dis-
cretions which I might have and exercise if present and acting personally
in the premises.
Other paragraphs of the will stated that in the sale of securities after
purchase or in participating in mergers, the trustees or executors should.
in their discretion, use their best judgment for the trust.
Under these provisions of testator's will, the executors asked the pro-
bate court to approve a sale of both blocks of stock to William C. Cook
and Associates for $988,731, although they had received from Alex S.
Dombey, who was acting as agent for named principals, an offer of $ 1,250,-
500 in cash. The executors elected not to sell to Dombey because testator
prior to his death "frequently indicated that he did not wish such stock
to come into the possession of Alex S. Dombey or anyone connected or
associated with him." The probate court not only admitted this testi-
mony but apparently relied upon it in approving the proposed sale by
the executors to William C. Cook and Associates at a substantially
lower price than the highest offer. Incidentally, when the probate court
approved the sale to William C. Cook, he was still attempting to obtain
the purchase money through loans and through the sale of stock.
The court of appeals properly reversed the probate court because the
extrinsic evidence as to testator's wishes should never have been admitted
to add to -the clear terms of the will. Furthermore, the executors' primary
duty was to the trust. Consequently, they were bound to sell .the stock at
the highest price obtainable. In the words of the court of appeals, "the
language authorizing the trustees to act as if they were the 'absolute
owners of the Trust Estate' and to exercise privileges and discretions
which the testator would exercise if present, cannot mean more than
that the decedent intended that the fiduciaries would act reasonably, as re-
quired by law, and for the best interest of the trust estate."
Death of Beneficiary Within 30 Days of
Testator's Death
The Ohio Revised Code38 provides:
When the surviving spouse or other heir at law, legatee or devisee dies
within thirty days after the death of the decedent, the estate of such first
decedent shall pass and descend as though he had survived such surviving
spouse, or other heir at law, legatee or devisee. . . . This section shall not
apply in the case of wills wherein provision has been made for distribu-
tion of property different from the provisions of this section.
In Barrick v. Fligle,39 the first of two cases involving this statute,
38. § 2105.21.
39. 103 Ohio App. 507, 146 N.E.2d 330 (1957).
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the testatrix died two days before her second husband to whom she left
certain property. There was no reference in the will to the Revised Code
as quoted above. The heirs of the husband contended that the section does
not apply when the person who dies first dies testate. The court of ap-
peals properly rejected this contention because the statute specifically
refers to "legatee or devisee" and affirmed distribution to the wife's heirs
of the property willed to her husband. The second paragraph of section
2105.21 above had no application because testatrix' will contained no
language to indicate that it should not be applicable.
In the second case, Alten v. Barnecut,40 the testator, after a few small
bequests, willed all his property to his widow. Twelve days after the
testator's death his widow executed her will. She died 20 days after
testator's death. It was contended by the legatees and devisees under the
widow's will that since her will was executed after the death of testator
the second paragraph of section 2105.21 applied. They particularly
emphasized that this paragraph refers to "wills." The common pleas
court properly construed this second paragraph as referring to "wills"
executed by the -person who dies first and ordered distribution of testa-
tor's property among his -heirs as intestate property.
Construction of Wills41
In Poe v. Sheehan42 the testator provided in his will "that within
one month after the inventory has been approved and the appraisement of
the real estate has become conclusive.., my beloved wife ... shall select
from my ... estate.., to the appraisal value of one-half my net estate,
those items which ... I give to her.. " The court of appeals construed
the word "shall" as directory only and therefore the wife did not have
to make the selection within the stated period.
Descent and Distribution
In a somewhat unusual case, the probate court in Kest v. State" held
that the illegitimate child of intestate's wife inherited intestate's property
when there were no surviving heirs other than this "stepchild." The
Ohio statute of descent and distribution lists "stepchildren' as the last
heirs before tide escheats to the state. Although the intestate was not the
father of the child, nevertheless, the child was the natural child of in-
testate's wife and therefore his stepchild.
40. 153 N.E.2d 792 (Ohio C.P. 1958).
41. For cases on the construction of wills and trusts involving future interests, see
FUTURE INTEREs, supra, in this survey.
42. 106 0. App. 413, 151 N.E.2d 660 (1958).
43. 77 Ohio L. Abs. 193, 146 N.E.2d 755 (P. Ct. 1957).
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In In re Estate of Sherick,44 a husband who had two sons by a prior
marriage died testate leaving certain property to his second wife who
survived him. The second wife died intestate possessed of the identical
property which she received from her deceased husband and survived by
no lineal descendants. One of the husband's sons predeceased his step-
mother leaving his brother as his sole heir. Consequently on the death of
the wife the sole surviving son of her husband (her stepson) took under
the half and half statute.
45
The probate court and the court of appeals held that under the Ohio
inheritance tax the son who inherited property under the half and half
statute took from his father and not from his stepmother. The Supreme
Court properly reversed these decisions because the stepchild obviously
took as heir of his stepmother.
A basic and general test of a statute of descent and distribution is
whether it provides for the distribution of an intestates property among
the natural objects of his bounty.46  Under this test the Ohio statute
is out of date because it provides for distribution among distant relatives,
who have been called "laughing heirs" by some writers, 47 as well as to
stepchildren in the absence of any relatives.48  The modern statutes of
descent and distribution normally provide for no distribution to relatives
more remote than the issue of intestate's grandparents. 49
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44. 167 Ohio St. 151, 146 N.E.2d 727 (1957).
45. OHIO REv. CODE $ 2105.06.
46. "If, by any accident a man should die without making his will, it would seem
to be the province of an equitable legislature to make such disposition of his prop-
erty as would, in ordinary circumstances most nearly correspond with his intention."
WILLIAMS, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 601 (18th ed.
1926); see also, Morison, Administration of Estates Act, 1954, 2 SYDNEY L. REV.
129 (1956).
47. "As the German's pungent phrase 'der lachende Erbe' (the laughing heir),
so aptly indicates succession by one who is so loosely linked to his ancestor as to
suffer no sense of bereavement at his loss arouses a certain resentment in society."
Cavers, Change in the American Family and the "Laughing Heir," 20 IOwA L. REV.
203 (1935).
48. OHIO REV. CODE § 2105.06.
49. SIMES, MODEL PROBATE CODE § 22 (1946). Compare, KAN. GEN. STAT.
§ 59-509 (1949) (no inheritance beyond sixth degree); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,
§ 1.3 (1950) (no inheritance beyond first cousins); Administration of Estates Act,
1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5 c. 23, as amended, Intestates Estates Act, 1952, 15 & 16
Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 64 (no inheritance beyond first cousins).
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